



Saving Grace at
**GUANTANAMO
BAY**

A MEMOIR OF A CITIZEN WARRIOR

MONTGOMERY J. GRANGER

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The Real Story of Detention and Medical Duty with
Joint Task Force 160 U.S. Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
During Operation Enduring Freedom and the Global War
on Terrorism (GWOT, as known within military circles)

8 February–26 June 2002

To my wife Sandra, my sons Benjamin, Harrison, Theodore, and Hamilton, and my daughter Hermione, and to all those who truly supported us during my deployments and beyond: Robert and Lillian Spears, Diane and Steve Domke, Karen and Tom Furgal, Elliott and Brenda Strobin, Anthony Perna, Tom Cassese, Richard Hyman, William Groth, Jerry Maxim, John Sexton, and Robert DelRosso. Thomas Fuller said, "If you have one true friend you have more than your share," and that is why I feel truly blessed by those who stood by us in our times of need.

Sandra, more than any other person, has survived and maintained her love for me and our children for too many deployments, too many sleepless nights, and too much uncertainty. No one should have to endure what she has, and yet many do, over and over again. I am unfathomably in her debt, and am more grateful than words could ever describe for her nurturing, healing, and fierce love and loyalty.

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Prologue

“One hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the most skillful. Subduing the other’s military without battle is the most skillful.”

—Sun Tzu

I became interested in prisoner of war operations as a teenager, when my mother introduced me to a friend of hers who had been a POW during World War II. Horst (his first name), a Scoutmaster nearly sixty years old, was a retired naturalized citizen of the United States of America when I met him. He had been a lieutenant in the German Wehrmacht, and was captured during the Battle of the Bulge by members of Patton’s 3rd Army. Horst told me his platoon was full of “old men and boys, and some *taube* (deaf).” They had no ammunition, no food, and no hope. Their supplies had been cut off for days, and they had no communication with their superiors. He said they woke up one snowy morning in the early winter of 1944 to find themselves surrounded by American Sherman tanks. He said a lone American noncommissioned officer (NCO), a *schwartz*e (black), walked unarmed to the center of a clearing in front of their position and motioned for someone to come out. The American soldier, Horst told me, had a white cloth attached to a stick. Horst went out and was able to communicate terms with the NCO. Horst and his platoon should walk out to the clearing, deposit their weapons in a pile, and surrender. Horst said he did so, without dissent amongst his charges, and they were taken away in Army trucks to “God knows where. We thought we would be killed because we had heard of SS killing American prisoners. But we were well cared for.” Horst said that at every turn he was treated with dignity and respect. He said they were immediately given wool blankets, and when they got to a holding area they

were given hot food and coffee. He said eventually he was taken to the United States to an internment facility. Horst claimed to still own the wool coat he was given as a prisoner of war. This story struck me as amazing, although it probably shouldn't have. I was proud of the fact that our troops treated him so well. I was proud to be an American, and I wanted right then to know more about this subject to see if Horst's treatment was the norm.

Of course, like most young boys growing up in the 1960s and early 1970s, I was aware of the Vietnam War, but don't remember hearing much about prisoners in that conflict until I was a bit older. I read about South Vietnamese interrogators taking suspected Viet Cong prisoners up in helicopters in pairs, tossing one out, and then not being able to shut the other one up as he gave every piece of information he could think of to save his own life. Eventually I read about our captured pilots at the Hanoi Hilton in North Vietnam. I began to see the difference between how the U.S. treated prisoners and how other countries did it.

I remember watching the TV sitcom *Hogan's Heroes*, which was about an eclectic group of WWII Allied prisoners of war incarcerated almost of their own free will by a bunch of bungling German soldiers who themselves were harassed by the SS. I remember thinking this couldn't possibly be an accurate depiction of what it was like, but it was fun to watch and very interesting, this idea of treating an enemy, someone who before they were captured was trying to kill you, with respect and dignity.

I discovered later in my independent studies that the truth was that the Law of War dictated how POWs should legally be treated, but it was really up to the countries at war how they decided to treat their captives, and many countries operated quite chivalrously. There was a pecking order of how you were treated based on your rank and even branch of service. For example, German WWII prisoner of war camps for enemy pilots (*Stalag Luft*) were the best places to be held, unless you were Jewish, in which case you would have been segregated and treated less well. Our own rules for actual POWs are similar to this day, with enlisted enemy prisoners of war employed in work details (payment must be offered), enemy non-commissioned officers employed as supervisors, and enemy officers not having to work at all, but receiving a stipend to spend at a prison camp store (called a canteen), also run by POWs. This however, is predicated on the status of the captive as a legal or illegal combatant. And POWs in American

camps aren't treated differently based on religion, ethnicity, or country of origin.

One of the first things done when U.S. forces capture a combatant is determine their legal status. If the combatant conforms to the Law of War for example, and is uniformed, carries his or her weapon(s) openly, and whose nationality is among those listed as legal combatant state opposed to us, chances are that the captive is a legal combatant. However, if the combatant is not uniformed, conceals his weapon(s), and is not of a nationality among those on a list of countries officially opposed to us in the conflict, chances are he's an illegal combatant. For an illegal combatant captured by United States forces, one of his first opportunities at receiving justice is a tribunal of military officers to determine his legal status if it is in doubt. The facts are presented in a court-like atmosphere and the alleged illegal combatant is given certain cursory legal rights with which they can plead their case.

I have been a part of mock tribunals of this nature in my training with Military Police Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) units. The standard of guilt or innocence is similar to that of the U.S. justice system grand jury indictment: If the preponderance of credible evidence presented would lead a reasonable person to conclude that it is more likely than not that the person is guilty of the offense, then the conclusion is the finding of a "true bill" of indictment. This is the 51 percent rule. The scale of justice needs tip only ever so slightly in one direction, but tip it must, or a finding of "no true bill" is declared and the defendant goes free.

If it is determined that a combatant is illegal, according to the Law of War and other rules, regulations, and procedures governing their treatment, things go very differently for the detainee. But that doesn't mean, in the U.S. military system, that he is condemned to abuse and torture—quite the contrary. Military forces of the United States are trained to conform to moral standards of conduct, and are trained to care for any captive with dignity and respect, regardless of legal status.

As I grew older and more curious I read more and more about war-time treatment of prisoners. I read about the British prison ships of our Revolutionary War, where more Americans died on these floating cemeteries in New York Harbor than were killed on the battlefield. I read about the Confederate Civil War prison at Andersonville, Georgia, where Union inmates preyed on each other amidst unimaginable conditions that slowly and wretchedly claimed over twelve thousand lives. The National Prisoner of War Museum, grown out of legislation

that created the Andersonville National Historic Site in 1970, is located in Andersonville and opened in 1998 to “interpret the role of prisoner of war camps in history” and “to commemorate the sacrifice of Americans who lost their lives in such camps.”

I learned of the tragic story of our own internment camps of Americans of Japanese and German descent. And although many of us might question the necessity of this action today, at the time our government deemed it necessary. Individuals were not tortured or abused, but many of their rights were abridged or denied, and their lives were turned upside down. Many lost property and jobs, and all lost a measure of dignity.

I read about the Bataan Death March at the beginning of World War II, the forcible transfer of over seventy-five thousand U.S. and Filipino prisoners of war by the Imperial Japanese Army over the distance of sixty miles through brutally hot tropical terrain without food, water, or mercy—other than at the business end of a bayonet.

In college I studied contemporary Russian/Soviet history as an elective, which cannot be properly understood unless one gains a working knowledge of the Gulag (Soviet political prison), so much a part of the Soviet-era Russian gestalt of refined misery. I learned from reading first-person accounts that Russian POW camps during WWII were notoriously harsh and tortuous.

The loneliness, the despair, and the nearly immeasurable human suffering numbering in the tens of millions of deaths, from the West African slave trade and the Holocaust, to the political prisons of Fidel Castro and the torture chambers of Saddam Hussein, can send one spiraling into nihilistic oblivion. Friedrich Nietzsche saw in his philosophical crystal ball the absolutely limitless black hole of mankind’s potential evil, and it has manifested itself in the jailers and murderers of the prisons of the world.

Perhaps one of the most disturbing depictions of a foreign prison was that of the Turkish prison detailed in the 1978 film *Midnight Express*, which told of an American drug smuggler’s nightmarish experience at the hands of sadistic and cruel guards. Billy Hayes, the American whose experience is the basis for the film, said after it was made that the depiction of the guards was not totally accurate, but the conditions depicted were. The organization Amnesty International, which is the world’s prison and human rights police, said in a 2002 report that “the practice of torture is widespread and typical of treatment in most prisons throughout the world.”

With that said, torture and abuse are decidedly *not* typical in U.S. Army prisons, either in the United States or out of it. Torture is not condoned in U.S. Army detention facilities that I have observed or even heard about in nearly ten years of service and two detention mission deployments—one to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and one to Iraq—with Army EPW units. The mere suggestion of torture would be tantamount to “fighting words” in the circles that I ran in because of the serious personal and professional commitment to the principle of fair treatment—with dignity and respect—which we held in highest regard for all captured combatants.

All of today’s military personnel are *volunteers*, and many of us who serve in detention operations, especially those in the Reserves, are in the law enforcement and incarceration professions in their U.S. civilian jobs, which is a great advantage over our Active Duty (AD) component comrades who more times than not have only book knowledge of the incarceration of EPW and detained persons, or have only brig or Fort Leavenworth experience, and who more often than not are put in charge of us Reservists once we deploy. And yes, there is discrimination towards Reserve units by their Active Duty Army counterparts—sometimes subtle, sometimes overt. And *no*, that is not to say there is never confusion or misinterpretation, especially by those in charge, whether Active Duty or Reserve. There are those in the EPW business, Reservists, who have confused the detainee incarceration mission with civilian-style corrections or work camps. Detention facilities for illegal combatants are decidedly not correction or rehabilitation facilities, and do not operate with a work camp mentality. But even these confusions have not led, in my experience, to institutionalized torture or abuse.

The definition of torture has gone through significant changes since 9/11. The “Bybee Memo” of 1 August 2002, sent from Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales, counsel to the president, amended the language of a 1994 statute that ratified the United Nations Convention against Torture and made the commitment of torture a crime. To be torture, the memo concluded, physical pain must be “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.” And inflicting that severe pain, according to the memo, must have been the “specific intent” of the defendant to amount to a violation of the statute. Human rights groups reacted with horror when the Bybee memo was leaked to the press in June 2004,

and it was quietly rescinded by the Justice Department on 30 December 2004.

The current definition of torture is from the U.S. Department of State's Second Periodic Report of the United States of America to the Committee Against Torture, 6 May 2005:

“For an act to constitute ‘torture’ it must satisfy each of the following five elements in the definition of torture set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a): (1) the act must cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering; (2) the act must be intentionally inflicted; (3) the act must be inflicted for a proscribed purpose; (4) the act must be inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official who has custody or physical control of the victim; and (5) the act cannot arise from lawful sanctions.”

The following is the definition of torture via the Code of Federal Regulations referenced above.

“8 CFR 208.18

§ 208.18 Implementation of the Convention Against Torture.

(a) Definitions. The definitions in this subsection incorporate the definition of torture contained in Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture, subject to the reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos contained in the United States Senate resolution of ratification of the Convention.

(1) Torture is defined as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a confession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.

(2) Torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment that do not amount to torture.

(3) Torture does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. Lawful sanctions include judicially imposed sanctions and other enforcement actions

authorized by law, including the death penalty, but do not include sanctions that defeat the object and purpose of the Convention Against Torture to prohibit torture.

(4) In order to constitute torture, mental pain or suffering must be prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from:

(i) The intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering;

(ii) The administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;

(iii) The threat of imminent death; or

(iv) The threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the sense or personality.

(5) In order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering. An act that results in unanticipated or unintended severity of pain and suffering is not torture.

(6) In order to constitute torture an act must be directed against a person in the offender's custody or physical control.

(7) Acquiescence of a public official requires that the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.

(8) Noncompliance with applicable legal procedural standards does not per se constitute torture.”

No definition of torture was ever discussed in any of my training as a Medical Service officer serving with U.S. Army Enemy Prisoner of War units, or in my studies leading up to completing my Military Police officer advanced training, nor in any briefing, seminar, or talk. It was never addressed because it was understood that we, as keepers of the American flame of Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage (the Army Values), do not harm, humiliate, torture, or abuse those entrusted to our care. I do not

know what U.S. military interrogators are told or trained on in this regard, and the CIA is absolutely not included in this caveat.

Some countries respect the Law of War, and some do not, and, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) representatives I have spoken with since 2002, most do not. But, also according to the ICRC, “nobody does [detention operations] better than Americans.” An ICRC Group leader said this to me while I was stationed at Abu Ghraib prison, west of Baghdad, Iraq, about a year after the infamous abuse scandal there, and while the Iraqi government ran a small prison within a prison (called the “Hard Site”) for common Iraqi criminals at Abu Ghraib, aided by U.S. penitentiary experts. I escorted the ICRC during their visit to the prison in-processing station, but they were much more interested in how the Iraqis were doing at the “Hard Site” than they were about our operations at Camp Redemption, the tent prison just inside the walls of Abu Ghraib in which we held detainees.

Unlike my conversations with ICRC physicians at Guantanamo Bay in 2002, the conversations at Abu Ghraib were not focused on how Americans treat their prisoners—or in this case, “detainees.” “You do it so much better than everyone else,” I was told. “We’re not really here to see what *you’re* doing,” they said. We briefed them, and I took them through the in-processing station at Abu, but they were noticeably impatient to get to the Hard Site. They had heard of abuses there—not by the American advisors, but by the Iraqi guards. They were concerned about security, retaliations, and brutality of Iraqis on Iraqis.

I have read the accounts about the mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib, and I have seen the photographs, and more than that, I have heard the firsthand stories of those who were there in 2004, because they were my colleagues in the 800th Military Police Brigade. I did not go with the Brigade to Iraq in the late winter of 2003. I was slated to travel with Task Force Iron Horse and the Fourth Infantry Division through Turkey into Northern Iraq to help set up and run EPW operations in the north, but the Turkish Parliament voted not to let U.S. troops through their country, so my unit, the 455th Military Police Detachment (Brigade Liaison Detachment, or “BLD”), stayed at Fort Dix, New Jersey, training and then waiting for deployment orders for nearly six months; meanwhile my brigade colleagues entered into a heart of darkness none of them could have imagined, and without us. Orders for the 455th never came that year.

These 800th MP Brigade colleagues of mine are good, honest, hard-working, and loyal Americans who went to Iraq to prove they were the best at what they did. Veterans of Vietnam, the Gulf War, Panama, Grenada, Kosovo and other conflicts and operations; all volunteers, all professional soldiers, all willing to give the last full measure of their lives for the good of our country, yet something did go terribly wrong.

The abuse at Abu Ghraib in 2004 was an aberration, and I think most reasonable people understand that, but has anyone really explained why? General Janis Karpinski made a good attempt in her book, *One Woman's Army* (published by Miramax in 2005), as she explains her role and that of the 800th MP BDE, and insists the unit was stretched too thin and was never given adequate resources to accomplish its mission. She claimed that her gender was a factor in how she (and, by association, the unit) was treated and supported. She also believed the fact that the unit was a Reserve unit and not a regular army unit, played a part in how she and the 800th were treated. Her most convincing observation was in pointing out that the ultimate failure leading up to the abuse was the fact that certain procedures were put in place by the general in charge at the time, Major General Geoffrey D. Miller, which forbade the Military Police command and staff from oversight of escort guard personnel while they were in the intelligence portion of the prison. Typically, escort guards simply escort detainees from point "A" to point "B" and don't get involved in "softening up" the detainees.

Miller, who was the commander of JTF Gitmo from November 2002 to July 2003, was then sent to Iraq and became the overall commander of all incarcerated persons under U.S. control there in August of 2003. In one of her many interviews in an attempt to clear her name, Karpinski said that Miller had told her to treat the detainees "like dogs." Miller denied this, but he set the tone and the command emphasis for how the intelligence officers handled the detainees in interrogations. He allowed the interrogators to direct prison guards to do what they did, including the abuse. Janice Karpinski may have had her problems, but she was decidedly not in charge of the interrogation section of Abu Ghraib, and she did not have command and control over what happened in that section of the prison. Based on what I've learned since then in conversations with members of her staff, I'd say this was almost an understatement.

General Karpinski's assertions are consistent with my observations at Guantanamo Bay: that the detention mission always plays second

fiddle to the interrogation mission. Of course this is natural, as the whole purpose of detaining illegal combatants during wartime is to hopefully obtain valuable information that could possibly save lives and prevent destruction of property. But how that is accomplished is a sometimes messy and imperfect process.

When I was at Abu Ghraib in 2004 to 2005, I noticed many differences in how an interview (we weren't allowed to even utter the term "interrogation") was conducted. There was a transparency there in that where I worked—the in-processing section of Abu—the interviews took place in a section of the same semi-hard building just around the corner from the main hall, which housed the incoming detainees and housed all other aspects of the in-processing operation, including medical. Since there were no glass windows or insulation in any of the buildings—just plywood covering the window openings—one would be able to hear any screaming or loud abuse, including slaps or things falling to the floor. No such sounds were ever heard. Furthermore, the detainees were taken directly from the main holding area (one large room) to the interview rooms in plain sight, and then brought straight back after the interview, also in plain sight. Guards had to sign these detainees in and out of the holding area and were trained to observe them for signs of abuse and report anything out of the ordinary. In the Army, just the *appearance* of impropriety can sometimes be a serious violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Everyone was minding their Ps and Qs, at least when I was there.

In his 2005 Xulon Press account, then 800th MP BDE Chaplain Michael Cannon, Jr., wrote about in his book, *Abu Ghraib: Reflections in the Looking Glass*, the juxtaposition between the expected standard of behavior from extremely young, under-trained National Guard troops—operating at the direction of still mostly un-prosecuted intelligence service personnel, in a mission they weren't supposed to be involved in ("prepping" detainees for interrogation), therefore abhorrently abusing detainees—and the ultra-violence-loving American public, evidenced by our lusty consumption of horror films, video games, and open brutality and graphic violence on prime time television, and a general acceptance of violence over, say, love, beauty, and caring. I would recommend this book as required reading for any American who has the courage to look in the mirror and reflect on their opinions of what happened at Abu Ghraib. And no, not to excuse anything that went on there, but to truly appreciate the *American* element involved. These young people whose lives were turned upside

down are a reflection in the looking glass of who we all are as Americans, for good or ill, whether we like it or not. If we choose to look at the horrific photos taken during the abuse, we should also be willing to look at our own “ugly American” face in the process. Understanding *why* is essential if we are to prevent such things in the future.

Unfortunately, we did not learn all the lessons we could have from that experience, but many of those things have more to do with leadership and logistics than they do with upholding good moral, ethical, and legal standards. The priority of resources in a war will always be the most important factor in deciding which elements of the battle will probably be the most successful. The overall commander and his or her immediate subordinates must decide how small to cut the pie slices for each aspect of the fight. Resources are not infinite in an American war. Politicians, generals, and soldiers all have a role to play in exacting the just right balance of how much of the pie to give to combat arms (infantry, artillery, armor), combat support (security, engineering, intelligence, communications, military police), and combat service support (supply, maintenance, transportation, medical services, military police). At the planning level we call this the principle of “economy of force.” Notice however, that Military Police are mentioned in both combat support and combat service support operations. The Military Police Corps of the United States Army is perhaps the most diversified and flexible corps in our military. It provides twenty-three different and distinct functions within the framework of the following five major areas: Police Intelligence Operations, Law and Order, Area Security, Maneuver and Mobility Support, and Internment/Resettlement. The latter area of responsibility includes: Detainee Operations, Dislocated Civilians, Populace and Resource Control, and U.S. Military Prisoner Handling. It is unique to the Army. No other branch of the military are trained or equipped to handle large numbers of EPW or detainees.

A wartime commander must decide how much support and resources to pour into each area. Nearly all of the Army’s combat service support units are Reserve units. Many combat support units are Reserve units as well, and some of the combat arms units are National Guard.

In peacetime one does not need a lot of medical, maintenance, supply, transportation, or detainee support. In wartime these units stand up, but are not necessarily included fully in the brotherhood of the Active Duty Army plans and operations, and—as happened to the 800th Military Police Brigade, a Reserve Unit out of Uniondale, New

York, leading up to the disgrace at Abu Ghraib—they were not taken seriously with regard to their requests for necessary resources for the mission. The resource of competent and effective leadership should not to be overlooked as an essential element here. Janice Karpinski was taken from without the 800th MP BDE world of leadership, which had served amazingly well in the Gulf War. Colonel Alan Ecke served as the Deputy Commander for the 800th MP BDE and was in position to competently and expertly take over the command of the unit as then-commander Brigadier General Paul Hill was retiring at the end of the unit's initial tour in Iraq, which saw the unit stand up detainee operations there. The unit was given an extended tour and its mission expanded to include running the “new” detention operations at Abu Ghraib. Janice Karpinski was taken from outside the unit as the bright shining female star of the MP Corps. Karpinski didn't know a soul in the 800th prior to coming to Iraq to be its new leader. The unit was decimated with morale problems after learning of its untimely extension. The recipe for disaster had just been concocted.

The operation at Guantanamo Bay at this moment (and since November of 2002) is a combined Joint Task Force Guantanamo. Back when the mission was in its first nine months or so there were actually two Joint Task Forces there. One was my Joint Task Force, JTF 160, which did the detention mission, led by Marine Brigadier General (one star) Michael Lehnert, and the other was JTF 170, which did the interrogation mission, led by Army Major General (two stars) Michael Dunleavy. Don't think for a minute that JTF 160 had priority over the mission. Again, the whole purpose of the mission was to obtain information from detainees in order to win the Global War on Terror.

U. S. President Barack Hussein Obama has signed an executive order to close the detention facility at Gitmo no later than 22 January 2010, but without detailing whether, where, or how many of the detainees are to be held or prosecuted. The Supreme Court of the United States has several times overturned presidential decisions to try the detainees according to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or modifications thereof, also authorized by Congress, asserting that (even though there is no legal historical precedence to support its ruling) detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (decidedly foreign soil), are entitled to the protections of habeas corpus. These protections have been denied to previous war criminals, even those who committed war crimes on U.S. soil. Such was the case during World War II, when eight captured German saboteurs were tried by a

military commission after President Franklin Delano Roosevelt asked the opinion of the Supreme Court as to the legality of such a trial and received the court's endorsement based on the belief that only citizens of the United States were entitled to its protections during wartime.

Where will these few hundred prisoners go if detention operations cease at Gitmo? What rules will apply to them, and based on what rationale or laws? Are we so desperate to join the world of political correctness that we would jeopardize our own sovereign right to hold and prosecute those illegal combatants who would destroy us? The current recidivism rate of one in seven released Gitmo detainees would suggest it would be unwise to simply close the place and set the detainees free.

Most people don't realize that in time of war the Army (the official jailer of Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, Protected Persons, and Detainees for the U.S. Military) employs trained Military Police and other branch officers, NCOs, and enlisted soldiers to identify, capture, process, intern, hear, try, dispense with, and release retained persons in an efficient, legal, moral, ethical, and professional manner. We do not train to torture or abuse. We do not condone mistreatment or torture of retained persons, no matter their status.

We are trained to use prison psychology on detainees in order to keep them fat and happy, as they are more likely then to be reliable intelligence assets, and are also therefore less likely to be dangerous to themselves, other detainees, and the guard force. Remember too, that wartime captives are trained on our detention operations and how to disrupt them. Every released detainee is a cache of valuable details on how best to resist and disrupt U.S. detention operations if he or his ilk should be captured in the future.

This journal expresses the raw, sometimes hideous side of human incarceration, but it also exposes the politically less correct reality that soldiers who care for detained persons act humanely, even though they are sometimes conflicted and confused, and that they can act honorably and with integrity within the mission of the Enemy Prisoner of War unit despite great hardship and phenomenal stress.

Hopefully, through the lens of my journal as the Joint Detainee Operations Group (JDOG) Medical Service Officer for Joint Task Force (JTF 160) at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, from February to June 2002, you will be able to appreciate the complex and emotionally demanding job of caring for detainees with dignity and respect, while simultaneously hating them for making your life a miserable living hell.

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